Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N)

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North

(SPLM-N)

Manifesto

9 October 2017

Contents

Introduction

Chapter One

The Root Causes of the Problem of Sudan ……………………..…………………………………………….…………………… 1
Chapter Two
Post-Independence Resistance Movements ……………………………………………………………………………………… 12
Chapter Three
Peace Agreements Dishonored…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 19
Chapter Four
The Inception and Development of The SPLM/A ……………………………………………………………………………… 20
Chapter Five

Vision, Mission, Principles and Objectives ……………………………………………………………………….………………… 28

Chapter Six

The SPLM/A-N Strategy ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..….…… 39

Chapter Seven

Real and Potential Friends and Enemies of The SPLM/A-N ………………………………………………..………..……… 41

Chapter Eight

Future Prospects ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….……. 43

Introduction

The first version of the Manifesto of SPLM/A was issued in July 1983 following the establishment of the SPLM/A to lead a protracted armed struggle. The second version was issued at the Second National Convention which was held in Juba in May 2008, three years before the secession of Southern Sudan and the disengagement of the SPLM in the South and SPLM in the North. The current Manifesto was approved by the Extraordinary National Convention of the SPLM-N, which was held in October 2017 in Kauda. It came to cope with the organizational and political developments that took place after the disengagement and the outbreak of the second war in June 6, 2011. It also came to address the fundamental issues that accompanied this period.

Chapter One

The Root Causes of the Problem of Sudan

1-1: The Historical Malformed Social Structure:

1-1-1: The peoples of Sudan have always been culturally diverse and still are; the diversity present today is known in the literature of the SPLM as the Contemporary Diversity.

1-1-2: These peoples have passed through different phases of development across the historical stages and witnessed the emergence of successive states and kingdoms, such as the ancient kingdoms Before Christ: Karma and Kush with their Nepatic and Meroetic periods. These kingdoms were followed by the Christian kingdoms: Nobatia, Makuria, and Alodia, then the Islamic kingdoms: The Fur Sultanate, the Funj Sultanate, the Kingdom of Tagali, and the Kingdom of Musabbaat. Since then, many groups have been living in the pre-state level of development. This historical path also witnessed many migrations to the land of Sudan which constitutes what is known as The Historical Diversity of the peoples of Sudan.

1-1-3: However, the peoples of Sudan are characterized by historical variations that is to say, they didn’t all go through the same stages of socio-economic development in any period in the path of their history. While some of these groups had reached the state level in their socio-economic organization, others remained in the primitive communal or tribal level. The only classification they all shared was that they were pre-capitalist social groups.

1-1-4: Modern colonialism, which began with the Turko-Egyptian rule in 1821, has established the modern central state which brought together the culturally diverse and historically variant groups of the peoples of Sudan within this central form of the state and, thus distorted the normal path of their development, which led to the formation of the historically malformed social structure of the modern state in Sudan since its establishment until today.

1-2: Slavery and Slave Trade:

1-2-1: Slavery is the deepest of the root causes of the problem in Sudan.

1

1-2-2: The phenomenon of slavery is old in Sudan, but it took its complete form, as a practice and as a trade, in the era of the Islamic kingdoms, particularly the Fur Sultanate and the Funj Kingdom. The phenomenon of slavery developed in the era of Turko-Egyptian colonialism and Mahdism. However, even after it decayed and was finally abolished by the Anglo-Egyptian colonization in the early 20th century, its profound effects have remained to this day.

1-2-3: The most profound effect of slavery in Sudan can be noticed in the current dichotomy and the historical disparity that divided the Sudanese peoples along ethnicity lines. The historical variation of the Sudanese peoples, which resulted in the myth of the “free Arab Muslim Master” (even if he was charcoal black) versus the “black non-Arab slave” (even if he was a Muslim and had never been enslaved before!) This division remained across the historical stages and is still existing. Its manifestations are as follows:

1-2-3-1: The Economic effects: The economic effects of slavery are reflected more in the laws regulating ownership and division of labor. The state has always been biased, or at least not committed to the rule of law, when it comes to deal with whom it considers to be a “free Arab Muslim Master” but when it comes to a “Black non-Arab Slave,” it confiscates his right or at least stands against him.

With regard to the division of labor, the problem is clearly manifested in the following:

Physical labor has always been carried out by the marginalized groups while commerce and trade, administration and high positions in the army and civil service have been monopolized by the Jallaba who consider themselves to be the masters.

1-2-3-2: The social effects: The social effects of the historical variation and dichotomy are manifested in the widespread discrimination and claims of racial supremacy in Sudan.

1-2-3-3: The Psychosocial effects: are manifested in Racism in all its forms:

1-2-3-3-1: The Proactive Racism: which is the racism of the “free Arab Muslim master” against the non-Arabs.

1-2-3-3-2: The Internalized Racism: which is the racism that is internalized by the alienated persons who identify themselves with their oppressors and practice it both against themselves and others at the same time.

2

1-2-3-3-3 – Reactive Racism: which is the kind of racism practiced in the form of hatred aginst the oppressors.

1-2-3-4: The Political effects: are manifested in the political tyranny of the Arabo-Islamists, who refuse to share power, wealth and sovereignty with those whom they consider to be “slaves”. The opperessed are left with two options: either to accept the master/slave relation and inferiority, or be extriminated. This explains much of what is obscure to many people about the conflict in Sudan (Ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide).

1-3: The Anglo-Egyptian Colonization:

1.3.1 The problem of the Anglo-Egyptian colonization in Sudan goes back to the expansion of colonialism in the late 19th century when the continent of Africa was dvided among the European colonial powers. The colonialists pursued a policy of divide and rule accompanied with practices that widened the gap and deepened the inequality among the components of the Sudanese society.

1-3-2: When the British departed, they left behind a phony independence, in which the colonial administrators were replaced by local opportunistic elites.

1-3-3: The political elites who took over power after colonialism, were a social group known as “Jallaba”.

The Jallaba emerged in Sudan in the 15th century from elements of foreign and local traders including slave traders who established themselves in urban centers such as Duiem, Omdurman and Sinnar. They are a hybrid of different races and nationalities from the indigenous Africans, and the immigrant Arabs, Turks, Greeks … etc, who have interacted and intermarried in a long historical process which took place mainly in Northern Sudan. Therefore, they are partially African but they chose to identify as Arabs even though many of them are charcoal black.

The Jallaba, were better prepared to inherit political and state power when Sudan was “granted Independence” in 1956. This, in addition to the fact that they were aided by the colonial regime and prepared directly or indirectly to assume power when direct colonialism collapsed.

3

The Jallaba are a privileged minority that adopted the ideology of Arabism and Political Islam and entrenched themselves to protect their economic, political and social position in the Sudanese society.

1-4: The Arabo-Islamic Centralism:

1-4-1: The Arabo-Islamic Centralism was established in Sudan through the cooperative relationship between the base of the Center (the internal part) and the invaders (the foreign part). The base of the Center consists of the Jallaba Group, the leaders of the religious sects, and the tribal chiefs and groups from Arab decent. The Jallaba Group has spearheaded the process of establishing and maintaining the Arabo-Islamic Centralism. This process has had social, political and economic causes:

1-4-2: The Social factors: The phenomenon of intermarriage between the Jallaba, the tribal chiefs and the religious leaders to build a kinship has been and remains the most important mechanism for inheritance of power and wealth in Sudan. Each tribal chief depended on the support of his clan that, in turn, relied on him to bring in benifits represented by direct and indirect rentier and tributes given to him. The sons of the tribal chiefs, the religious leaders, the Jallaba and the clans associated with them, have taken the priority in accessing the modern education and the favor in scholarships to study abroad. That was the reality which produced the model of the contemporary Sudanese intellectuals, who have the same characteristics of these social groups from which they descended and therefore, they are accomplice with the interests of these groups; a situation that has had significant impact on the on going conflict in Sudan.

1-4-3: The Political factors: are related to a great extent to the tyrannical concept of political power in the Arabo-Islamic culture, and ideology. This concept later became the basis of power in Sudan. The monopoly of the state power in the consciousness of the people, is linked to a metaphysical source (and not mandated by people) and a right to certain clans.

1-4-4: Economic factors: Political power constituted the biggest source of wealth for the Jallaba, religious leaders, clan and tribal chiefs through collection of taxes, royalties or tributes and allocation of the surpluses for their own benefits. These groups have always used their privileged status to their advantage by tilting any competitive economic transactions in their favor. Social

4

and political interference in economic transactions is a prominent norm and practice in the history of the Arabo-Islamic culture.

1-4-5: The groups of the Arabo-Islamic Centralism consider themselves the official representatives of the Arab culture in Sudan and its social, economic and political depth.

1-4-6: Consequently, the Arabo-Islamists have imposed their culture as the sole component of the Identity in Sudan and pursued, a policy of Cultural Genocide towards other Sudanese ethnic groups cultures.

1-5: Marginalization:

1-5-1: The historically malformed social structure in which power and wealth have been concentrated in the hands of Arabo-Islamic groups through the inheritance of historical privileges, led to the marginalization of other Sudanese ethno-cultural groups that have been suffering from social, economic and political inequalities existing today.

1-5-2: Thus, Marginalization is a process of excluding individuals and groups from access to power and wealth by creating structural barriers that limit their opportunities. These barriers become a source of privilege for the members of the dominant groups. Some are economic barriers related to ownership rights and division of labor, others are ethno-cultural, religious, regional or gender-based barriers. This makes marginalization a complicated and multi-dimensional phenomenon and should be dealt with in this respect. Marginalization can be classified into simple and compound marginalization;

1-5-3: The Simple Marginalization: is the economic or developmental marginalization, where people are divided between haves and haves not; those who find it easy to earn a living, and those who find it difficult to make a living; the privileged wealthy and the disadvantaged poor regardless of their Ethno-cultural, religious, gender or regional affiliations.

1-5-4: The Compound Marginalization: It involves several factors and structural barriers that deprive individuals and groups of rights and privileges obtained by others. These factors (in addition to the economic one) include, ethno-cultural, religious, gender-based and regional, affiliations, on the basis of which marginalization is graded.

5

1-6: The Identity:

1-6-1: The issue of identity is of particular importance with respect to the historical conflict in Sudan because of the dichotomy that produced the myth of the “Arab free master” versus the “black non-Arab slave” mentioned above.

1-6-2: The Identity takes three overlapping forms: the individual identity, which is not a subject of controversy, and the group identity, whether it be for an ethnic, religious or cultural one, that is also not a matter of dispute, but rather the dispute is over the state identity, which is considered to be a transcendent identity that assumes representation of the Individual and the collective identities of its citizens. The source of legitimacy of this identity depends on the acceptance and recognition by citizens. If they do not accept it, then a crisis of identity will arrise, as is the case in Sudan.

1-6-3: The essence of the problem of identity in Sudan is the role it plays in creating structural inequalities among the components of the Sudanese society. That is to say, the Identity adopted by the state creates and preserves privileges in access to power, wealth and symbolic social benefits for some groups, while these privileges themselves become structural barriers to the other groups in the process of accessing power, wealth and symbolic social benefits.

1-6-4: Consequently, the problem of identity in Sudan is that the social strata of the Jallaba and its allies, who adopted Arabo-Islamic culture, have imposed their identity on the state, and have been trying to impose it on the rest of the peoples of Sudan. That is to say, they have reduced the identity of the state into their own identity and at the same time they generalized the identity of their group to the state through the dialectic of reduction/generalization.

1-6-5: The dialectic of reduction/generalization is in fact the reduction of the interests of the people in the interest of the privileged Jallaba group and its allies to disguise their interests and privileges as interests and privileges of the people of Sudan.

1-6-6: This has been done through several methods, the most important of which is the imposition of Arabic language and their perspective of political Islam on religion and history. It has been also done through exploiting elements of the dominant culture to justify the privileges

6

within the state in order to gain more power and wealth. This explains the correlation and compatability of socio/economic classes with religious, ethno-cultural and regional affiliations in Sudan.

1-7: The Land Issues:

1-7-1: Land ownership and its use in Sudan is one of the most important issues that led to the outbreak of wars in Sudan since the colonial time and it continued to this day. The policy of confiscation and land grabbing for the establishment of agricultural schemes in some areas, particularly the areas of the marginalized groups, is an strategic policy started by the colonizer and then followed by the successive “postcolonial” regimes in Sudan.

1-7-2: In the areas of the marginalized groups, land ownership is regulated by customs and traditions, as opposed to the case in the North and Central Sudan, in which land ownership is governed by the laws of the state and its institutions, and is therefore subject to these laws which entails the legitimacy and protection. For example, the Government has allocated the lands in Gezira agricultural scheme to its local inhabitants, meanwhile it deprived the indigenous people in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile in the areas of mechanized agricultural schemes of their land and transformed them from owners to workers in their own lands.

1-7-3: The State has also enacted laws that deprived the marginalized people of their land and resources. The Unregistered Land Act of 1970, and its provisions which were incorporated into the Civil Transactions Act of 1984 stipulates that all unregistered lands are owned by the State. This act paved the way for the expropriation of land, in the marginalized areas, from the original owners and endowed it to absentee land lords of traders, bureaucrats, military elites, and foreigners.

1-7-4: The policy of displacement of the marginalized people from their land and replacing them by other groups has become systematic strategy in Sudan, as is the case in Darfur where the state has removed some indigenous groups from their historical land by force and resettled new groups, including foreigners. The state attempted to legitimize this act by creating new provinces or localities and changing the historical names of regions and monuments, giving the new groups

7

the power to govern them. This practice is intended to make it difficult to discuss any issues relating to ownership of land and historical rights.

1-8: Uneven Development:

1-8-1: The Uneven development in Sudan started with the emergence of the modern state in the Turko-Egyptian era. The slave trade has had a deep role in the uneven development between Sudanese regions and groups. The Jallaba, from central riverian groups had collaborated with the colonial regime and exploited the material and human resources of Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Upper Nile, Bahr El-Ghazal and Darfur. This led to the impoverishment of the groups inhabiting these areas while enriching the Jallaba homeland by slave labor and the wealth accumulated through slave raiding and trade.

1-8-2: After independence in 1956 the local elites adopted the same colonial pattern of economic, social, administrative, and development planning that favored central Sudan.

1-8-3: In spite of the early emergence of some voices calling for even development and decentralized forms of government, the Jallaba rulers dismissed those calls as regional and racist. Sudan’s successive political leaders ignored the fact that Development should start from the rural areas to the city. By concentrating development projects geographically in central Sudan, the gap between the center and the peripheries has gradually widened.

1-8-4: In addition to the inequalities inherited from the historical malformed social structure, these policies led to the widening of the gap and the creation of structural imbalances in economic, agricultural, industrial, infrastructure, services and human development plus lack of participation in the leading administrative and political decision making institutions.

1-8-5: The disparities in development between the center and the peripheries has produced negative effects, the most important of which are:

1-8-5-1: Migration of able-bodied youth from the peripheries to the center to become part of the mechanisms to control the marginalized groups by the Arabo-Islamic Centralism.

8

1-8-5-2: Exploitation of the raw materials of the peripheries at the lowest cost for the benefit of the Arabo-Islamist centre, where they process, add value and return the manufactured materials as commodities at high cost to be consumed by the orginal producer in the peripheries.

1-8-5-3: Exploitation of the marginalized groups in low-paid physical labor for the interest and well-being of the Jallaba.

1-8-6: These phenomena led to the collapse of the foundations of development, not only in the marginalized areas, but also in the entire national development in a gradual manner, leading to political turmoil, economic crises and disruption of social structure in Sudan.

1-9: The Armed Political despotism:

1-9-1: Force and violence have almost always been the source of the legitimacy of the modern state in Sudan since its emergence in the Turko-Egyptian era. The successive regimes in Sudan have been imposing and protecting a corrupt political system by armed forces and militias. This practice has consequently led to the outbreak of civil wars in most parts of Sudan.

1-9-2: The armed political despotism is also rooted in the Slave/Master conception of the dominant Arabo-Islamist who try to protect their inherited privileges and to perpetuate their domination by force.

1-10: The Forced Unity:

1-10-1: The Sudanese people have inherited a state estabelished by the colonial regime and governed by groups that confiscated freedoms and practiced discrimination on regional, ethno-cultural and religious grounds. These groups have tried to impose and maintain the unity created by the colonizer, on the basis of the monolithic exclusive Arabo-Islamist Identity. This process was accompanied by the practice of racial, ethno-cultural, and religious oppression, which led to civil wars and subsequently the secession of Southern Sudan.

1-10-2: The current regime has also tried, and still trying, to impose this coercive unity on the rest of the people of Sudan, threatening of more wars and more divisions in the country.

1-11: Gender problem:

9

1-11-1: For many decades, Sudanese women have been suffering from repression, marginalization, discrimination and inequality in terms of distribution of opportunities and other forms of gender-based marginalization.

1-11-2: Although gender discrimination is due to beliefs and attitudes that are shaped and based on the individuals-gender, beliefs and attitudes of social nature usually have no legal consequences, but gender-based marginalization and discrimination by the state has legal consequences in many aspects, the most important of which are the opportunities for education, employment, travel, public office, etc.

1-11-3: Socially, gender differences have been used to justify the different roles of men and women, and in some cases arise claims about primary roles and secondary roles. This is in spite of the fact that scientific studies have proven that gender differences are in fact historical social constructs, and not natural ones as many people might believe.

1-12: politicization of religion:

1.12.1 Politicization of religion is one of the major problems that the Sudanese people have faced. Colonizers had used Christianity for colonial purposes and the Arabo-Islamist Jallaba group has exploited Islam for the protection and expansion of its inherited privileges and domination.

1-12-2: Those who claim to be Arabs, the Jallaba in particular, have politically used Islam through the call for application of Shariaa (Islamic Laws) as a Trojan horse for smuggling in their racial and cultural agenda to justify the inequalities between them and the majority of the Sudanese marginalized groups in order to perpetuate their cultural hegemony and control over power, wealth and symbols of social benefits, such as sovereignty, superiority and prestige.

1-12-3: The politicization of religion has always played a negative role in politics in the modern state in Sudan. For the concept of “Hakimiya = Sovereignty of God” which gives the right of legislation to God, by confiscating the right of people to develop methods for their lives, and to set values for themselves, is contrary to the foundation of the modern state which is secular by nature that adopts the legitimacy of Social Contract and the authority of the people to invent the appropriate means for managing their affairs. Thus assuming “Hakimiya = sovereignty of God”

10

for governing a modern state squanders the opportunity to build democratic institutions capable of managing the contradictions of society and its many arising problems.

1-12-4: It becomes normal for those who claim to have absolute truth to persecute their opponents even if they share the same religious belief, when they assume political power.

1-12-5: Political Islam has caused the weakness and instability of society because it has worked on what discriminate between and divide people, which has led to more conflicts that cannot be solved by consensus and consequently the spread of civil wars and perpetuation of violence. Not only that, but also the combination of religion and politics has weakened religion itself and corrupted politics at the same time.

11

Chapter Two

Post Independence Resistance Movements

Resistance movements in Sudan have started after independence as emerging national liberation movements, which confined themselves to political, economic, and social demands. The emergence of these movements was a historical necessity resulted from the root causes of the problem in Sudan, particularly the policies of the racist state of Jallaba and the practice of racial arrogance, cultural exclusion and marginalization. These movements have contributed to the accumulation of the revolutionary consciousness and action that eventually led to the emergence of the SPLM as a fully-fledged national liberation movement. The most important of these movements are:

2-1: The Black Bloc:

The Black Bloc was founded in 1948, before independence. It was headed by Osman Mutwally, from the Dajo tribe in Darfur. His deputy was Zain El Abidiin Abdel-Tam, a retired military officer who was a member of the White Flag League Society, was from Dinka, while the treasurer was the famous figure Dr. Mohammad Adam Adham, a graduate of the Kitchener Medical School, who was also a Dajo from Darfur. The Black Bloc opposed the British policy in Southern Sudan and called for raising the level of political awareness among the southerners. The Bloc took that name to show the blackness of the Sudanese and the African origin of the Sudanese Nation.

As a result of the common ground for the call for independence of Sudan, and the lack of financial ability and support, the group began to cooperate with the Umma Party. That cooperation caused the division between the members of the Bloc. The strength of the Black Bloc in the Capital city in that period, was measured by the number of members who participated in the General Assembly in Omdurman, they were four thousand individuals.

In the early 1950s, the Black Bloc and other groups attempted to build a broad alliance with the southerners, but failed because the southerners accused the Bloc of being allied to Egypt, that was in spite of the fact that many of the southern leaders joined the National Unionist Party at that time and ran the elections under its name in the south and won seats.

12

As a result of the reaction of the northern community, the lack of adequate funding, and the lack of organizational skills, the Bloc resorted to clandestine activities. Some of its members later formed regional organizations, such as the General Union of the Nuba Mountains (Father Phillip Abbas Ghabboush), Beja Congress and Darfur Renaissance Front.

2-2: Anyanya (1) – (1955-1972):

Anyanya (1) was the first resistance movement that emerged in the dawn of Independence to resist oppression and to struggle for justice and equality. The Anyanya (1) revolt began when civil service positions were “Sudanized” in which Southern Sudan got less than ten of the approximately eight hundred posts which were available. In August 1955, four months before the British colonizers departure, the rebellion began with the disobedience of a Southern battalion from Sudan Defense Force in Torit when its commanders were ordered to move to northern Sudan in order to contain the rebelion. The disobedience led to chaos and insecurity in Southern Sudan. That action marked the beginning of Anyanya (1), which continued to fight the central government for 17 years (1955 – 1972) until the war ended with the signing of Addis Ababa Accord in 1972. The government granted South Sudan Regional Autonomy which was the most important demand of the movement.

Anyanya (1) was followed by emergence of many resistance movements in various parts of the country. The following are some of them:

2-3: The Beja Congress (1958)

The Beja Conference was established in Eastern Sudan in 1958. Dr. Taha Osman Beleeya had presented the demands of the Beja Congress to the then Prime Minister Abdalla Khalil in 1958 in a memorandum that included the following demands and complaints:

A) Lifting the suffering of the region that resulted from the unfair policies of the Center.

B) Building awareness of the Beja citizens.

C) Addressing the problem of the lack of facilities and stopping the deterioration of existing infrastructures.

D) Complaining from the absence of development projects and demanding to stop projects that harm grazing.

13

The Successive governments have ignored these demands and complaints which led the Beja to take up arms later.

2-4: The Red Flame Movement – (1958)

The Red Flame Movement emerged in 1958, after the British had left. It was led by Ahmed Mustafa Pasha and some civilians and soldiers. The Movement has raised the slogans of equality, justice and development. It also called for the participation of the people of Darfur in the parliament by stopping the misrepresentation in which individuals from the North were brought to become candidates in the constituencies of Darfur and represent its people in the parliament!

2-5: The Suni Movement – (1964)

The Suni Movement emerged between 1964 and 1966 and expressed the need to restore the historical Sultanate of Darfur. The movement demanded the secession and independence of Western Sudan to join West African Sultanates. This movement found great support among officials, teachers, soldiers and tribal leaders. The bulk of the movement members were from the retired Sudanese soldiers after the war of Anyanya (1). Among prominent founders of the movement were Abbas Abdallah Abu Shook and Ahmed Mohamed Nur.

2-6: Darfur Renaissance Front (DRF) 1964:

Darfur Renaissance Front (DRF) was founded in 1964 by Ahmed Ibrahim Direej. It emerged as a result of the growing political consciousness of the people of Darfur to demand justice in the distribution of power, wealth and development and to confront the exclusion campaigns against marginalized peoples in Darfur. The Front presented a number of leaders from Darfur, but it started to decline after its leaders joined other political parties; Ahmed Ibrahim Direej allied with the Umma Party and Mahmoud Bashir Jamma joined the Socialist Union while Ali Al Haj joined the National Islamic Charter.

2-7: The General Union of the Nuba Mountains – (1965)

The General Union of the Nuba Mountains was founded in 1965 after October Revolution. The demands of the Union focused on the following:

14

Political Empowerment of the people of the Nuba Mountains.

Humane Treatment of the people of the Nuba Mountains.

Allowing the people of the Nuba Mountains to represent themselves instead of importing parliamentary candidates from the North.

Allowing the people of the Nuba Mountains to participate in national decision-making centers in the government and in the civil service.

Provision of basic services in the Nuba Mountains and the abolition of forced labor.

The prominent founders of the Union were Father Philip Abbas Ghabbush, Mohamed Hammad Kuwa and Atrun Attiya.

2-8: The General Union of South and North Funj 1967:

The General Union of South and North Funj was founded in 1967 by late Ahmed Osman Al-Rayah. The Union was a political organization that reflects the aspirations of the people of Blue Nile after the failure of the traditional parties to perform the tasks. Although many of the people of Blue Nile belonged to the Khatmiyya sect, the traditional parties had shown arrogance, hegemony and exclusion. These parties brought candidates from the North to represent the people of Blue Nile.

In 1969, the Union joined the Black Bloc after the Nimeri Military Coup when it was harassed and accused of racism and tribalism.

The Union participated in the establishment of the Solidarity of the Sudanese Rural Forces in 1985 at the graduates’ club in Madani led by El-Hadi Tenjour who participated in the workshop of Ambo in Ethiopia in 1985 and in the Kokadam Conference in 1986. The Union of South and North Funj remained adherent to the issues of Blue Nile since its establishment.

2-9: The Kush Liberation Movement 1969:

The Kush Liberation Movement was founded on June 9, 1969. Since its establishment it adopted the call for the liberation of Sudanese regions from the grip of the Center and demanded equal economic, social, political and cultural rights for all national groups of the Sudan.

The Kush Liberation Movement affirmed that the problem of Sudan was not in the South, not in the West, not in the North and not in the East, but the problem of Sudan was in the nature of the

15

institutions of government in Khartoum and its system, which takes 80% of its income from the regions of the Sudan while it spends less than 20% on those regions.

2-10: The Armed Resistance of Mubarak ALmasha Group (1974-1982):

Mubarak Almasha Group, which was part of the General Union of the Nuba Mountains, started its armed activity in 1974. The group went to South Sudan for military training.

In 1982 the group returned to the Nuba Mountains and launched an armed resistence in the area.

2-11: Komolo Organization – (1975)

The origin of the Komolo organization dates back to November 1972 when a small cell was formed in the name of the Association of the Sons of the Nuba Mountains among the students of Kadugli High School (Tillo) under the chairmanship of Kuku Mohammed Jagdoul. The beginning was cultural and clandestine. However, by 1975, with the increasing awareness among these students, after they entered university, they met with Yusif Kuwa Makki, who provided leadership and guidance. At the same time, former members of the students’ association from Tillo and other secondary schools who had joined civil service in Kadugli and other areas in the Nuba Mountains, organized themselves in a clandestine movement called Komolo under the chairmanship of Awad Al-Karim Kuku Tiya.

In 1980, when Yusif Kuwa Makki moved to Kadugli to teach English at Kadugli high school, the Komolo group chose him as patron of the movement. Komolo continued to recruit members and expand its activities through out the Nuba Mountains.

The organization decided to contest the parliamentary elections at the local, regional and national levels, and that was the beginning of its involvement in politics openly. Komolo revolutionized the political thought and created political awareness among the youth. Its members participated in the local, regional, and national ellections and won seats.

After the emergence of the SPLM/A, Komolo Organization decided to join the armed struggle in 1984 under the leadership of Yusif Kuwa Makki. Komolo Organization helped in mobilizing the people of Nuba Mountains and was able to provide SPLA with thousands of fighters and contributed significantly to political expansion of the SPLM in Northern Sudan.

16

2-12: Anyanya (2) and other Southern groups:

The Akobo revolt broke out in 1975 to confront former president Nimeri’s maneuvers and systematic attempts to abolish the Addis Ababa Agreement. Some of the members of this revolt united with some dismissed former members of Anyanya (1) and announced the formation of Anyanya (2) in the Upper Nile.

Later in 1982, another armed movement was formed under a different leadership but adopted the same name, Anyanya (2), in Bahr el-Ghazal. The high-rank officers of Anyanya (1) continued to organize themselves from within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to correct the situation either by attacking and capturing Juba or by withdrawing into the bush to launch a popular protracted armed struggle.

In conjunction with that armed resistance, some prominent Southern political leaders and some students started to organize several clandestine movements to mobilize the people of the South against the dismantling of the Addis Ababa Agreement. These organizations included the National Action Movement (NAM), the Movement for Total Liberation of Southern Sudan (MTLSS), the Juwama African People’s Organization (JAPO), and the Council for the Unity of Southern Sudan (CUSS), as well as the South Sudan Liberation Front (SSLF). These movements had actually started guerrilla war in 1982.

2-13: The Sudanese National Party (1985):

The Sudanese National Party was founded after the April Uprising in 1985 by Father Philip Abbas Ghabbush. That was a historic culmination of the struggles of the people of the Nuba Mountains through the General Union of Nuba Mountains, and as a result of the existence of similar ideas and concerns about the problems of Sudan adopted by many political forces interested in the cause of the marginalized people, the rural forces and many independent figures.

The party won eight parliamentary seats in the 1986 elections, including the victory of its chairman, Father Philip Abbas Ghabbush, in the constituency number (36) in Al-Haj Yusif in Khartoum North.

17

2-14: The Solidarity of the Sudanese Rural Forces (1986):

The Solidarity of the Sudanese Rural Forces was established in November 1986 as part of the measures taken by the marginalized people to confront the reactionary and sectarian forces that have dominated power since Independence. The Solidarity consisted of thirteen political organizations, notably the Darfur Renaissance Front and the Southern Sudan Political alliance. The presidency was made rotational (three-month duration) for each of the organizations. The Solidarity did not succeed in presenting something tangible in the Sudanese political life as a result of the exposure of its members to absorption by the sectarian parties, followed by the coup of the National Islamic Front in June 1989.

2-15: Free Lions Organization 1999:

Free Lions Organization was established and officially announced in January 1999. The founder of the organization Mabruk Mubarak Saliim said that the Free Lions Organization was founded as a result of the exposure of the Rashayda tribe to systematic targeting by the National Congress Party regime, which came to power through a military coup in June 1989.

The Free Lions Organization asserted that in 1991 the authorities confiscated more than 600 vehicles belonging to the Rashayda tribe without presenting any justification. The Organization also announced that the Khartoum regime had killed 500 Rashayda citizens, which pushed the tribe to take up arms against the regime.

The Free Lions Organization has later reached an agreement with the Khartoum regime under which it took a seat in the central government, while a number of its members were absorbed in marginal positions in Eastern Sudan.

2-16: All these movements mentioned above have emerged as regional organizations with demands limited to development and justice in the distribution of economic, social and political opportunities and rights. The successive governments of Khartoum dismissed these demands, and ignored these organizations as representing miniority groups which pushed most of these movements to eventually take up arms.

18

Chapter Three

Peace Agreements Dishonered

3-1: In the long journey of the Sudanese peoples to achieve just peace and stability, the Sudanese resistance movements signed many peace agreements with the successive governments in Sudan since the exit of the English colonizers in 1956. The most important of these agreements are:

– Addis Ababa Accord – 1972

– Khartoum Peace Agreement – 1997

– Comprehensive Peace Agreement – 2005

– NDA Cairo Agreement – 2005

– Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja) – 2006

– Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (Asmara) – 2006

– Doha Peace Document (on Darfur) – 2012

3-2: The policy of dishonoring peace agreements:

3-2-1: The Successive Sudanese regimes dishonored all signed peace agreements that dealt with Sudan’s crises. The dishonoring of the signed agreements became a characteristic of all regimes that ruled the country. Although these agreements did not adequately address the root causes of the problem, except the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the ruling regimes eventually abrogated all of them.

3-2-2: It was proven by practice that the successive regimes in Khartoum use these agreements as a mechanism to deceive the opponents in order to gain time to maintain power for as long as possible, that is in addition to the habit of the ruling elites in Khartoum of resorting to signing agreements with their opponents to revitalize themselves and to try to gain legitimacy through these agreements.

19

Chapter Four

The Inceptoin and Development of SPLM/A

4-1: Conditions and Climate that Precipitated the Revolution:

4-1-1: The SPLM, as a political and military organization, was the result of a far-sighted view of the Sudanese revolutioneries, men and women. It was a result of conscious planning, coordination and determination of the political and military leaders.

4-1-2: The circumstances were appropriate for the revolution, and the only needed element was the right leadership. The plan was either to have a general revolt by military garrisons in Southern Sudan with the aim to take Juba or to resort to the option of the protracted armed struggle.

4-1-3: During that period many signs of weakness began to appear in Nimeri’s regime, included the issuance of many resolutions to dissolve the Regional People’s Assembly, which finally ended with the decision to re-divide South Sudan into three regions on November 6, 1983, that led to depletion of trust between the people and the regime creating a general sense of the need for change.

4-1-4: Thus the resistance developed into a revolutionary movement, when major Kerubino Kuanyin, took command of the forces in Bor. All these moves laid the foundation for the revolution and resulted in the formation of the SPLM /A.

4-1-5: Dr. John Garang de Mabior was at the forefront of these events, while he was coordinating with William Nyuon and Kerubino Kuanyin directly from Khartoum, and he personally moved to Bor area to command the operations.

4-1- 6: In the meantime, the General Command of the Sudanese Armed Forces in Khartoum had confirmed that the movements of Major Kerubino were indications of rebellion and therefore ordered battalion(116) in Juba to attack Bor. Thus, the battle broke out on 16 May 1983. The attacking government force was led by Lieutenant Colonel Dominic Cassiano, who later became a member of the coup d’état of the El-Bashir regime.

20

4-1-7: Colonel John Garang’s group had held several meetings with representatives of the Anyanya (2) aiming to unifying the leadership, but the efforts failed. The two groups differed on the vision and military strategy. These differences led to the split between the two groups on 3/9/1983, and that set the beginning of a new conflict between the rebels themselves.

4-1-8: In regard to the difference of vision about the Sudan, the group of Colonel Dr. John Garang wanted to fight for a unified secular socialist Sudan, while the other groups wanted to separate Southern Sudan from the North. In fact, the negotiation between the two groups was doomed to fail since its inception because of irreconcilable differnces.

4-2: The Establishment of SPLM/A (1983):

4-2-1: The Anyanya (2) Group insisted on its position and was therefore attacked jointly by Battalions 104/105 under the command of Major William Nyuon Bany, who managed to completely expel Anyanya (2) from the Bilpham area. After Major William Nyuon’s victories, Bilpham became the Headquarter of SPLM/A.

4-2-2: The SPLM/A was formed as a national liberation movement in 1983 and it declared its manifesto on 31 July 1983. This date was considered to be the official date of the establishment of SPLM/A. After that, the political and military leadership was formed and the founders were as follows:

Col. John Garang: Chairman of SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA.

Lt. Col. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol: Vice Chairman of SPLM and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA.

Lt. Col. William Nyuon Bany: Chief of Staff.

Major Salva Kiir Mayardit: Deputy Chief of Staff for Security and Operations.

Major Arok Thon Arok: Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration and Logistics.

4-3: Development and expansion of SPLM/A in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile:

Expansion of SPLM/A in the Nuba Mountains:

4-3-1: In 1985 the SPLM developed rapidly and its military operations spread over many areas in Southern Sudan. In 1986, the first group of SPLA arrived at South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains

21

under the command of First Lieutenant Awad al-Karim Kuku Tiya and First Lieutenant Telefune Kuku Abu-Jalha to meet SPLM/SPLA cadres and to prepare for the reception of troops from the South. On June 30 1987, a detachment from the Sobat Battalion entered the Nuba Mountains under the command of Lieutenant Yusif Karra Haroun. On 27/7/1987 the Volcano battalion entered the Nuba Mountains under the command of Commander Yusif Kuwa Makki and dispersed the enemy forces in the Battle of Ramla and reached Sarf El-Jamus then established the Headquarter in Achurun. From there the Volcano Battalion managed to liberate the areas of Um-Doreen and Um-Dulu.

Five thousand (5,000) youth were mobilized and sent in batches to training centers in Southern Sudan. This force returned to the Nuba Mountains in 1989 in the name of Kush forces.

The Expansion of SPLM/A in Blue Nile:

In 1986, SPLA troops reached the Blue Nile led by First Lieutenant Jibril Kurumba Omong, Commander Peter Kuma Lueni and others from Blue Nile, including Commander Joseph Tukka Ali. In 1985 Malik Agar Eyre joined the SPLM/A and was promoted to the rank of Commander after the first National Convention in Chukdum in 1994. He was appointed an alternate member of the High Command of the movement and governor of the Blue Nile region.

The Expansion of SPLM/A in Darfur:

The SPLA forces arrived in Darfur under the command of Commander Abdalaziz Adam Alhilu and Commander Daoud Yahya Bolad in November 1991. The SPLA forces fought fierce battles against SAF and the Janjaweed (Arab militia) and managed to destroy them, but eventually withdrew to the south in Feb. 1992 due to harsh climate conditions.

The Expansion of SPLM/A in Eastern Sudan:

The New Sudan Brigade was established in 1995. Its forces arrived in Eastern Sudan under the command of Commander Abdalaziz Adam Alhilu in the same year. The SPLA forces were able to liberate many towns and control many military garrisons in eastern Sudan between 1998-2005.

22

The Establishment of Joint Civil and Military Administration (CMA):

4-3-2: As a result of the expansion of the liberated areas, the SPLM/A formed a joint administration in these areas. The joint administration was called the Civil-Military Administration (CMA), which included a military commander, community leaders, and members of the syndicated organizations.

4-3-3: The SPLM managed to expand and open more external offices in a number of countries.

4-3-4: The SPLM expanded its organizational structure and became more flexible which included both the political and military leadership.

The First National Convention (Chukdum 1994):

4-3-5: The SPLM held its first National Convention in Chukdum in 1994. The Convention marked a qualitative shift in the political organisation of the SPLM. The convention recommended a constitution for SPLM/A, which was later issued in 1998. Many changes followed the dissolution of the SPLM/A’s top political and military leadership. The liberated areas were divided into five fronts as follows:

First Front: Upper Nile.

Second Front: Bahr el-Ghazal.

Third Front: Equatoria.

Fourth Front: Nuba Mountains.

Fifth Front: Blue Nile.

4-3-6: In Chukdum Convention, the SPLM Legislative Council, the National Liberation Council (NLC), was established. It consisted of (110) members. In addition to that, the civil service and the judiciary were separated from the military. The most important characteristic of the new structure was the separation of powers and the establishment of the five regions.

4-4: The Challenges Faced by the SPLM/A:

4-4-1: When the National Islamic Front took over power in the country in a military coup on June

30, 1989 the political situation in Sudan was aggravated by politicizing religion, militarizing

23

society, and declaration of jihad (Islamic holy war) against the citizens of the marginalized areas under the pretext of counter insurgency strategy to defeat the rebellion.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and the collapse of the socialist bloc, marked the historical transition to new era, which included some important changes in the region: the collapse of the government of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia; Emergence of Eritrea as independent state and the collapse of the state in Somalia.

4-4-3: The outcome of these international and regional events, particularly the loss of support of Mengistu regime, created a sense that the SPLM had been weakened. Indeed, these factors harmed SPLM/A and on 28 August 1991 the Nasser Group led by Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. Lam Akol declared the split from SPLM/A.

4-4-4: The division caused a lot of suffering and spelling damage to the people of the Sudan, particularly in Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile. It disrupted the progress of the SPLM/A towards victory. It also politically disabled the movement at a time of regional and international tension. In addition to that it incited the SPLA fighters against each other, resulting in heavy loss of lives among soldiers and innocent civilians.

4-4-5: On the other hand, the National Islamic Front effectively used the military and political division in its war against the SPLM/A and signed an agreement with the dissident faction in Frankfurt on January 25, 1992, in which it offered the right of self-determination to the people of South Sudan. The division among the southerners was exacerbated and the faction of Dr. Riek Machar managed to attract many of those who call for the separation of southern Sudan.

4-4-6: The biggest challenge that faced the movement in its history was the sudden death of Dr. John Garang on July 30, 2005, 22 days only after he was sworn in as First Vice President of the Republic.

4-5: The Interim Period after signing of the (CPA) in 2005:

4-5-1: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Government of Sudan signed on January 9, 2005, required a change in the administrative system of SPLM/A as an inevitable result of the establishment of a federal system

24

granting autonomous rule to Southern Sudan and special status for the Two Areas (Nuba Mountains/ South Kordofan and Blue Nile) and Abyei area.

4-5-2: The agreement also required the transformation of SPLM/A from a political/military organization into a political organization and the formation of a transitional structure that suits these historical changes were declared.

4-5-3: The Transitional Constitution of the SPLM was subsequently issued in the meetings of the National Liberation Council in Rumbek in 2006, which recommended the reorganization of the SPLM in all the 25 Sudanese states. A civil political organization was formed to propagate the vision of New Sudan throughout the country.

4-5-4: The SPLM held its Second Convention in May 2008 in Juba to complete the organizational structure in accordance with the constitution approved at that Convention and remained in effect until the referendum in Southern Sudan followed by the independence of South Sudan in July 2011.

4-6: The Disengagement between the SPLM in the South and in the North:

On February 15, 2011, the Political Bureau of the SPLM decided the political, organizational, administrative and military disengagement of SPLM in the South from SPLM in the North by merging the two states of Nuba Mountains/South Kordofan and Blue Nile with the Northern Sector and recommended the continuation of the two movements as separate entities.

4-7: The Second Liberation War in South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile

(2011):

4-7-1: Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the National Congress Party (NCP) persistently violated the Protocol of the Two Areas. NCP had armed tribal militias and created unrest in the Two Areas, particularly in the Nuba Mountains. It tampered with the population census, which was the cornerstone of the election process and the exercise of the right to Popular Consultation. The SPLM/A in Nuba Mountains/South Kordofan firmly opposed these violations and forced the regime to redo the population census and run a complementary election in Nuba Mountains/South Kordofan.

25

After the secession of the South Sudan became immenent, the National Congress Party attempted to ignite war in the Two Areas. In Feb. 2011, President Omar al-Bashir announced, in his speech in Gadarif, an exclusive approach to declare Sudan an Arab Islamic state after the people of Southern Sudan voted for secession. He said that they did not want any “Daghmasa = confusion.” That was an early declaration of war, followed by his famous speech in Mujlad in 27 April 2011 During the election campaign of the candidate of the National Congress Party for the post of governor in the complementary elections of the state of Nuba Mountains/South Kordofan, in which he declared that if they did not take power in the region through the ballot box, they would take it by the bullet box; adding that they would remove the Jalaleeb (traditional Arab men’s civil dress) and replace it with Khaki (military uniform). He went on to say: “we will chase ‘them’ hill after hill and cave after cave”.

4-7-2: The Khartoum regime mobilized tens of thousands of armed forces, the Central Reserve Forces, the Popular Defence Forces and the National Security Forces. It also transported large quantities of military equipment and heavy weapons to Kadugli, the state capital, and other cities such as Dilling, Talodi, Abu Jibaiha and Umm Doreen. It did the same thing in Blue Nile, particularly in Damazin and surrounding cities, in a clear violation of the provisions of the Protocol of the Security Arrangements.

The SPLA (proper) had completed the withdrawal to the south of the 1/1/1956 boarder line according to the agreement, with the exception of (3,000) fighters of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) as it was stipulated in the (CPA). All these actions indicated clearly that the regime was preparing for war.

4-7-3: In May 2011, in a clear violation of the Security Arrangements Protocol, which stipulates that the Joint Integrated Unit forces shall remain until April 9, 2012 in case the South Sudan chooses separation. Lt. General Ismat Abdul Rahman, Chief of Staff of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) issued his orders to Division (14) stationed in Kadugli to immediately disarm the SPLA soldiers of the Joint Integrated Units by June 1st 2011.

4-7-4: On June 6, 2011, Khartoum regime attacked the houses of the SPLM leaders in Kadugli in an attempt to murder them and disarm the SPLA fighters in the Joint Integrated Units. Meanwhile, the government forces killed hundreds of civilians in Kadugli and buried them in

26

mass graves. The SPLA forces from the Nuba Mountains stationed south of the 1/1/1956 borderline left with no choice but to intervene in order to protect civilians.

4-7-5: The war has expanded to include most areas of the state of South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains. The SPLA forces took defensive positions to protect the civilians and then launched counter attacks on the positions of the government forces and achieved sweeping victories and liberated wide areas and controlled many military garrisons.

4-8: Blue Nile: The surprising attack, and wide violations:

4-8-1: On the night of September 2nd, 2011, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched a large-scale attack on areas where the SPLA forces were stationed in the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) inside the city of Damazin, forcing SPLA fighters to withdraw from the city for fear of endangering the lives of civilians. The SAF rushed to bombard the houses of the prominent leaders of SPLM. Then the security forces of the regime carried out large-scale raids and arrests that included all suspected members and/or supporters of the SPLM-N.

4-8-2: The aim of the attack was to create a new reality on the ground that may enable the Sudanese government to evade its obligations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) to declare a state of emergency, to suspend the Constitution and to aboragate the right to exercise Popular Consultation procedures that were almost to complete in Blue Nile. The government also intended to accelerate its plan to eliminate the SPLA-N and to end the existence of SPLM-N after the secession of the South Sudan. It also wanted to achieve a surprise victory to raise the morale of its forces after the crushing defeat they suffered in the Nuba Mountains.

27

Chapter Five

Vision, Mission, Principles and Objectives

5-1: Vision: The vision of the SPLM/A is to create a New Sudan. The New Sudan is an intellectual and political project aimed at restructuring the Sudanese state on new bases, which entails the total destruction of the Old Sudan and dismantling of the Jallaba institution and its allies from the bureaucratic and opportunistic local elites to pave the way for building a secular, democratic Sudan, voluntarily united on the basis of freedom, justice and equality.

5-2: Mission: The mission is to build a well-organized and effective SPLM capable of raising the political consciousness and capable of organizing the masses and committed to support the SPLA in order to accomplish the historical task of building a new, secular, democratic Sudan, voluntarily united in its diversity and tolerant to its different components and to its neighbors; to become a country that accommodates all.

5-3: Principles and Objectives: The SPLM-N operates in accordance with the following principles and objectives:

5-3-1: Freedom:

5-3-1-1: Freedom is the supreme principle and ultimate goal of SPLM-N. The Liberation, associated with its name, is an ongoing act, not limited to a particular situation neither confined to one domain without the other.

5-3-1-2: The most important task of the revolution is to liberate the Sudanese people in general, which requires liberation of the marginalized people from the physical and psychological (moral) effects of slavery and colonialism, i.e. from, exploitation, poverty, oppression, and cultural alienation, as well as liberation of the dominant groups from its slave-master mentality and illusions of racial supremacy and racism.

5-3-1-3: Freedom is thus a comprehensive issue in which a person is able to act according to his/her own will to be able to exercise freedom of thought, freedom of belief, freedom of

28

expression, freedom of association, freedom to hold public office or delegate it. Without freedom there will be no justice, and without justice there will be no equality.

5-3-1-4: The SPLM-N stands firm in support of the implementation of fundamental freedoms enshrined in human rights charters.

5-4: Justice and Historical Accountability:

5-4-1: Justice in the concept of the New Sudan means equal opportunities and equal distribution of these opportunities not only among individuals, but also between groups and regions as well.

5-4-2: The SPLM-N aims to achieve justice by removing all historical injustices committed against the marginalized groups and regions.

5-4-3: The SPLM-N strives to apply Transitional Justice and Historical Accountability to all those who have committed material and psychological (moral) violations against the Sudanese people and to compensate all those affected by historical abuses and injustices, including the harm caused by enslavement.

5-5: Equality and the State of Citizenship:

5-5-1: The SPLM-N believes in equality between individuals and equality between ethno-cultural, religious and national groups. It also believes in the equal partnership of all citizens in their country. It is against the slave-master mentality that inevitably divides the people of Sudan into masters and slaves in practice.

5-5-2: The SPLM-N also strives to deepen the awareness that individuals cannot be equal before the law or before any institution within the State, if the groups they belong to, whether ethno-cultural or religious, etc., are not equal, as legal bodies, before the State. For that reason, the Movement emphasizes both individual and collective equality.

5-5-3: The SPLM-N affirms that citizenship should be the basis for rights and duties, where people living in large political units (states) might not be equal on the basis of language, culture, race, color or religion, but the only base on which they can be equal is citizenship.

29

5-5-4: Citizenship has rights and duties, and these rights and duties can only be exercised properly in a just and democratic society that is committed to the principles of equality and justice and able to protect them and to open the prospects for improving their practice with a vision that looks forward to the future.

5-6: Secularism:

5-6-1: The SPLM-N adopts secularism as an intellectual, philosophical and political thesis based on the principle of separation of religion from the state. Secularism has three aspects:

5-6-1-1: A cognitive aspect represented in subjecting natural and historical phenomena to the standards of verification, and confirming that history is a process of continuous change.

5-6-1-2: An institutional aspect that considers religious institutions as a private sphere while the state is a public sphere.

5-6-1-3: And a political dimension which is the separation of religion from state.

5-6-2: The modern state in Sudan is necessarily a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-doctrine state. In the process of its development to build a common identity that brings together all diverse Sudanese entities, it must therefore be governed by a Constitution and institutions based on the equality of all individuals and groups in rights and duties, and these rights and duties should be guaranteed and protected by laws derived from this Constitution and the relevant institutions. This must clearly be reflected in the regulations and daily practices of the organs of the State to become a well-established tradition.

5-6-3: Therefore, the SPLM-N stands with secularism, as the separation of religion from state, to pave the way for the establishment of a State based on citizenship rather than religious or ethno-cultural affiliations.

5-6-4: The Secularism adopted by SPLM-N treats all religions equally, regardless of being the belief of majorities or minorities, and regardless of the nature of the religion. The concept of a secular state is based on freedom of belief as a fundamental and inherent right that is equal to all, and without

30

any privileges for the majority, or disadvantage for the minority. Therefore, SPLM-N commits to implementation of the following principles:

5-6-4-1: The State shall not impose any religion, religious doctrine or religious practice on the citizens and separate religion, which is naturally voluntary in its nature, from the state, which is coercive in essence.

5-6-4-2: The State shall ensure freedom of belief, freedom of expression, and freedom of practice of religious rites. It shall also ensure freedom of religious association, freedom of religious organization and religious proselytisation (D’awa) by peaceful means.

5-6-4-3: The State shall enact laws prohibiting any party (individual or group) from attempting to impose religion or religious faith on any other individual or group of citizens.

5-6-4-4: The State shall prohibit religious discrimination: that is to say, the State shall treat all religions and all religious sects (in the same religion) equally and fairly as legal entities.

5-7: Pluralistic democracy:

5-7-1: The SPLM-N adopts pluralistic democracy and considers it not only a system of governance, but also a philosophical, educational, social and economic perspective. It is at least an open political system because, with the rule of the majority, it provides the minority with an opportunity to become a majority.

5-7-2: The SPLM-N intends to change the policy of formal education, which is dedicated to consolidate the culture of despotism and reproduces the mindset according to the official culture determined by the ideology of the state. It is well known that education is not neutral, but closely linked to the ideology of the dominant groups. Different political systems in the modern state, including the Sudanese state, use education to legitimize social practices that support the existing government system. The SPLM-N will focus on managing cultural diversity on democratic basis, for it understands that the marginalized peoples have real interest in the democratic system because it provides equal opportunities for all.

31

5-7-3: The concept of pluralistic democracy can be summed up as the “legitimacy of difference,” based on open competition and sharing of power. A system that requires, a set of procedures such as:

5-7-3-1: Constitutional stability based on the philosophy and perspective that respects difference and the secular standards that are measurable, verifiable, and subject to modification.

5-7-3-2: Balance of power on the basis of national State so that each group is recognized and enjoys equal cultural, economic, and political rights.

5-7-3-3: Independent judiciary to protect the democratic foundations and to preserve constitutional rights, and ensure the integrity of the application of laws.

5-7-3-4: Professionalism of law enforcement agencies.

5-7-3-5: Security and peaceful coexistence. For during wars and the ethnic, religious and sectarian conflicts, and education based on exclusion, the democratic system will be under threat. This inevitably disrupts and jeopardises democracy.

5-7-3-6: Guarantee of freedom of thought, expression, association and peaceful action without any restrictions.

5-8: Rule of Law:

5-8-1: Law represents the cornerstone of justice and equality, and requires the existence of specialized and independent institutions, to ensure the rights of all citizens.

5-8-2: Judicial and constitutional reform will effectively assist in establishing strong foundations to prevent conflicts by removing or reducing their causes. Reform requires the political will of the elites, the independence of the legal bureaucracy, the pressure of the people and civil society organizations. It is an important element in supporting democracy.

5-8-3: The SPLM-N is working to establish and develop a legal system that provides justice for all regardless of their social, political, economic, ethno-cultural or regional backgrounds.

32

5-9: Human Rights:

The SPLM-N is committed to all international human rights conventions and treaties, whether they are individual or collective rights, and ensures their proper application at the international, regional and local levels.

5-10: The Decentralized System of Governance:

5-10-1: The SPLM-N aspires to establish a decentralized system of governance that empowers the people and characterized by popular participation, transparency, accountability and respect of the rule of law and create the right environment for sustainable economic and social development and prosperity.

5-10-2: The decentralized system of governance according to New Sudan perspective is based on the following:

5-10-2-1: Radical restructuring of the central authority to become committed to the interests of the marginalized groups and regions in particular and the interests of all Sudanese in general.

5-10-2-2: Redefining the relationship between the Center and the Regions and grant more powers to these Regions;

5-10-2-3: Empowering local government bodies to exercise the powers granted by the Constitution and by the law.

5.11: Equity of Utilization of Resources:

5-11-1: The SPLM-N will ensure the recognition of the customary norms of ownership and use of land; the recognition of ownership of the tribes of their lands, without excluding the right of the state to use these lands for public interest in accordance with fair laws.

5-11-2: The SPLM-N strives to achieve the development of the marginalized communities and to emancipate them from the full dependence on land as a sole source of income. It also emphasizes the need for optimal use of land.

33

5-11-3: The SPLM-N also strives to regulate the relations between different groups by issuing fair laws that protect their economic, social and political rights, combined with developing and reorganizing land management institutions and introduce laws to address the problems of environmental degredation and to pursue sustainable development.

5-12: Pan-Africanism

5-12-1: Pan-Africanism is a political and intellectual movement based on anti-slavery and anti-colonialism and it works for the liberation of African peoples from economic, social and political exploitation. It is a movement against all forms of racism. The Pan-Africanist movement is also working to raise the political awareness against all forms of exploitation and aim at achieving freedom and unity of African peoples

5-12-2: The SPLM-North views the Pan-Africanism as a source of African consciousness and as a change ideology that tries to develop Africans’ sense of the importance and highness of their system of values. It works to develop consciousness of the importance of solidarity to confront colonialism. It also views African consciousness as an intellectual stream that expresses and elevates the true humanity of African human beings.

5-12-3: Pan-Africanism brings together Africans of black origin from within the continent and from the diaspora who have carried with them the feelings of allegiance and belonging to Africa to distant lands overseas. The movement promotes their solidarity throughout the world for freedom, ending domination and dependence, and bases its principles on the belief that unity is a vital factor for economic, social, and political progress.

5-12-4: At the beginning of the sixties, the Pan-Africanist movement expanded and established the Organization of African Unity under the leadership of a number of African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Julius Nyerere, Walter Rodney and others. The influence of the movement extended to include African revolutionary leaders such as Patrice Lumumba, Thomas Sincara, Lebold Sengor, Emperor Hellaslasi, Jomo Kenyatta, and later the Pan-Africanist movement included Dr. John Garang de Mbior, and Yusuf Kuwa Mekki.

5-12-5: The SPLM-N affirms its sincere and total commitment to the ideals of the Pan-Africanism and works for the ultimate goal of the Pan-Africanist movement which is the political

34

unity of all African peoples after their liberation. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) strives to achieve the voluntary unity of the Sudanese peoples after liberation to become a model for the unity of African peoples.

5-13: Managing diversity and identity issues:

5-13-1: The SPLM-N adopts the theory of unity in diversity “Sudanism,” which can be defined as an association based on the historical and contemporary facts of the Sudanese peoples under a new system based on freedom, justice and equality that establishes peaceful coexistence, and considers diversity as a source of social richness.

5-13-2: By adopting the theory of unity in diversity, the SPLM-N does not only reject the theory of “melting pot,” but it asserts that the national identity is irreducible in any of its components, but includes all these dimensions, without any presumption of melting one into another or presupposing the isolation of one from the other. This social association “unity in diversity” or “Sudanism” ought to be based on the voluntary choice and free will of the people of Sudan.

5-13-3: The SPLM-North will implement Cultural Relocation of communities that have been physically dislocated from their original areas due to wars or symbolically/morally dislocated by cultural domination and oppression exercised by the dominant groups through State educational institutions and its media.

5-14: Economy:

5-14-1: The SPLM-N adopts the Social Market Economy, which allows free market mechanisms to operate, and at the same time allows state intervention to protect and develop vulnerable groups such as women and the marginalized groups in general through Affirmative Action and other measures. The state shall address areas of interest to the society that are outside the market mechanisms’ concerns such as health, education and culture.

5-14-2: This entails the abolishing of the ‘Clan Based Rentier Economy’ in which the dominant groups gain income without participating in the production processes. This is, in fact, the dominant economic pattern in Sudan led by parasitic capitalism known as “Islamic Economy”,

35

which is characterized by monopoly, trade separated from production and practiced by interconnected clans and tribal groups as a necessity required by this kind of economic pattern.

5-14-3: The economic perspective of the New Sudan seeks to benefit from all opportunities offered by knowledge and the development of human society by becoming a ‘knowledge economy’ to accelerate development and eliminate the negative effects of globalization. That is by developing a scientific and strategic approach to address the economic challenges by increasing production and productivity, achieving food security, provision of clean water and preserving the environment.

5-14-4: The economic perspective of the New Sudan will correct the random urban growth and the pattern of development that focuses on the center against the peripheries and rural areas. It is by achieving the SPLM’s slogan of “transferring the city to the countryside,” instead of migration to the Cities, where the migrants end up in ‘shanty towns’ and their living standards deteriorate.

5-14-5: In order to achieve the slogan of transferring the city to the countryside, it is necessary to ensure that people settle in their lands, which helps to flourish agriculture and agro-industries. That could be achieved through modernization and industrilization so that factories are built in areas producing the raw materials, and above all by the implementation of Affirmative Action for war-affected areas and for the marginalized groups.

5-15: Civil Society:

5-15-1: The SPLM-N works to abolish the policies of totalitarian regimes that aim at reducing the role of civil society and manipulating it through the restrictive laws to control and dominate all aspects of the state.

5-15-2: The SPLM-N strives to support and strengthen civil society organizations and build a strategic partnership with them to enable the state for achieving progress and prosperity.

5-16: Voluntary Unity and the Right to Self-Determination:

5-16-1: The unity upon which the “Old Sudan” was founded was a coercive unity created by colonialism and carried out under extraordinary conditions. It is known that the central state in

36

its current form was created by the Turko-Egyptian colonization in 1821. Its formation was completed during the Anglo-Egyptian colonial era and it has never been chosen by the peoples of Sudan. It is therefore a form of a coercive unity imposed by colonialism to serve its interests in the past and to serve the interests of the Arabo-Islamist Jallaba group and its allies who inherited the colonial power and replaced it by local elites.

5-16-2: The unity proposed by the New Sudan Project is a voluntary unity that stands on new basis. It is based on the principles of freedom, justice and equality, among all Sudanese individuals and groups with full regard to both historical and contemporary diversity of the Sudanese people.

5-16-3: As a result of the failure of the successive regimes in Khartoum to manage the diversity of Sudan, and their continuous attempts to impose the exclusive and racist Arabo-Islamic identity on the ethno-culturally diverse peoples of Sudan through the state organs, and as a result of the lack of seriousness in implementing the signed peace agreements, the SPLM-N adheres to its position for the right of self-determination for all marginalized Sudanese groups. Self-determination shall be exercised either internally, by consensus on a secular democratic system of governence, which provides these marginalized peoples with the opportunity to exercise all of their rights within a united state that guarantees these rights or externally, by full independence to liberate themselves first and then to seek their ultimate voluntary unity.

5-17: The Legitimacy of the Social Contract:

The SPLM-N adopts the concept of Social Contract to become the basis of the state legitimacy and sovereignity to the people, which entails abolishing of legitimacy of violence and theocracy practiced and propagated by the groups of Political Islam.

5-18: Gender Equality:

The SPLM-N has played a key role in the liberation of women and improvement of their situation in Sudan. It strives to establish a secular democratic governance in the Sudan, which ensures the rights of all, including equal rights for both sexes, empowering women and developing their capacities as well as raising the awareness of societies on gender status.

37

Millennium Development Goals:

The SPLM-North strives to achieve the Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations, which are:

1. To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.

2. To achieve universal primary education.

3. To promote gender equality and empower women.

4. To reduce child mortality.

5. To improve maternal health.

6. To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.

7. To ensure environmental sustainability.

8. To adopt a global partnership for development.

38

Chapter Six

The Strategy of SPLM/A-N

The strategy of SPLM/A-N is based on the following:

6-1: Building a well-organized and effective popular movement capable of raising the consciousness of the people, organizing the masses and supporting the SPLA-N to build the power required for accomplishment of the historical mission, which is the total destruction of the Old Sudan and eradication of Jallaba institution to build the new Sudan on its ruins. This task requires the following:

6-1-1: Early determination of the correct leadership of the SPLM/A-N so that the movement is not hi-jacked by counter revolutionaries and the opportunists.

6-1-2: Establishment of effective media apparatus with the widest possible participation of the general public, including various means of mobilization: Internet, satellite and radio stations belong to SPLM-N.

6-1-3: Establishment of external offices and activation of diplomatic missions to clarify the vision, principles and objectives of the SPLM-N and to counter the hostile platforms abroad.

6-1-4: Support and develop the Political and Leadership Training Institutes to train and qualify political and leadership cadres to be able to achieve the objectives of the revolution and build the New Sudan.

6-1-5: Raise political consciousness of all marginalized groups and masses, syndicates and professional organizations and train them in all aspects to be partners in the revolution and in building the New Sudan.

6-1-6: Building political alliances with revolutionary liberation movements, progressive political parties and civil society organizations which are in line with New Sudan Vision.

39

6-1-7: Attract Sudanese men and women of various affiliations to join the SPLM-N to accelerate the momentum of the revolution to achieve the historic mission of building the New Sudan.

6-1-8: Building a Historical Bloc through alliances with the marginalized groups and with the forces of modernity and change in the Center to struggle for the fundamental change of the historical situation of the Sudanese State, which has harmed the majority of the Sudanese people, to build a New Sudan committed to pluralism, democracy, justice, equality and peaceful coexistence.

6-2: Continuing the armed struggle as a historical necessity which means that it is not an option among other options as long as the institution of Jallaba remains on power. This requires the following:

6-2-1: Activating the Military College to continue training and qualifying the Officers at all levels.

6-2-2: Continuing the training of new recruits in the general training camps, in addition to the rehabilitation of non-commissioned officers and security services and technical units.

6-2-3: Develop and Support the SPLA-N to continue military operations against the enemy and to attract Sudanese women and men from all over the country to join the SPLM/A-N politically as well as militarily. Thus, the SPLA-N aim at ultimately destroying the sources of violence of the Old Sudan and play its role in building the New Sudan.

6-3: Negotiations: The SPLM-N will continue negotiations as a means of resolving disputes by peaceful means whenever it is possible and wherever it is available. That is in order to convince the ruling regimes and regional and international actors to allow the Sudanese marginalized peoples to exercise their rights, particularly the right of self-determination as a democratic and an international human right enshrined in international charters; either internally by consensus on a secular democratic system of governance that guarantees all rights in a united country, or otherwise externally by full independence.

40

Chapter Seven

Real and Potential Friends and Enemies

Through its experience in the ongoing struggle to build New Sudan, the SPLM-N has become able to identify its enemies and its friends, the real and the potential ones.

Real and potentioal friends of SPLM/A-N

7-1: Friends Inside:

7-1-1: The revolutionary forces and forces of change, the workers’ syndicates, the activists, the student, youth, women, trade unions, farmers, pastoralists and all the marginalized people in Sudan.

7-1-2: Liberation Movements and Parties in line with the New Sudan Project.

7-1-3: Civil society organizations that are committed to democracy and human rights.

7-2: Friends Abroad:

Democratic States, organizations, and institutions that support the principles and objectives of New Sudan.

Real and Potential enemies of the SPLM/A-N

7-3: The enemies inside:

7-3-1: The Arabo-Islamist Jallaba Group with its coercive armed forces and its allies from the bureaucratic elites, and the opportunistic local elites who work for their own interests and trade in the issues of the marginalized people.

7-3-2: Religious Extremist and religious fundamentalist groups that support terrorists.

7-3-3: The reactionary forces.

7-3-4 The racist groups.

41

7-4: Enemies abroad:

7-4-1: Regimes that sponsor terrorism and support religious extremism and racist ideologies.

7-4-2: Individuals, groups, and regimes violating human rights.

7-4-3: Corrupt officals in regional and international institutions and organizations.

7-4-4 All forces that support the Old Sudan.

42

Chapter Eight

Future Prospects

8-1: The SPLM-N is fully convinced of the validity of New Sudan thesis. The SPLM-N program is based on the objective realities of Sudan and presents a solution to the nationality and religious questions and all other issues within the framework of a democratic, secular, and voluntarily united Sudan.

8-2: Social justice is the cornerstone of any revolutionary liberation movement. People’s support is not compatible with coercion. The aim is not to replace oppression by oppression but to eliminate it by organizing the masses and finding a way to encourage them to engage in joint action and gain their popular support and inspire them to cooperate voluntarily. The SPLM-N will work to strengthen and promote peaceful coexistence, reconciliation, healing of social fabric among the people and building appropriate institutions to prevent conflicts.

8-3: The SPLM-N will work to build women’s capacities and engage them effectively in all positions and institutions and ensure their participation in decision-making processes.

8-4: The SPLM-N will create a conducive invironment for the continuation of the armed struggle, stimulation of popular uprising, or the exploration of new means to bring about the desired change in Sudan and to restructure the Sudanese state on new bases.

8-5: The Movement will play an active role in the regional and international levels and it will support democracy, human rights, and international security and peace.

8-6: The SPLM-N, in cooperation with the international community, will combat terrorism, Human Trafficking and seek to consolidate the coexistence of all religions and beliefs.

8-7: The SPLM-N will build strong political, economic and social ties between the two peoples of Sudan and South Sudan.

8-8: The SPLM-N will strive to create balanced relations with the neighboring countries in order to maintain stability and cooperation for the common interest of the region.

43

8-9: The SPLM-N will fully engage in the activities of Pan-Africanism and work towards the liberation and unity of the peoples of the African continent.

8-10: Based on the correct theory and proper application, relying on the long struggle heritage, commited to the armed struggle, and equipped with the material and moral support of the Sudanese people, the SPLM-N will inevitably win.

Long live SPLM-N

Long live SPLA-N

Long live the voluntary unity of the Sudanese people

The Struggle continues and Victory is certain

9 October 2017

44